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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether costs for trust and estate investment management
and advisory services incurred in order to fulfill a trustee’s
unique fiduciary obligation with respect to investment of the
assets of a trust or estate are fully deductible from trust or
estate income under 26 U.S.C. § 67(e) as costs "which would
not have been incurred if the property were not held in such
trust or estate."
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OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit (Petition Appendix ("Pet. App.") l a-19a) is
published at 467 F.3d 149. The decision of the Tax Court
(Pet. App. 20a-30a) is published at 124 T.C. 304.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on
October 18, 2006. Pet. App. la. A timely Petition for Reheating was denied on January 19, 2007. Pet. App. 31a-32a.
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari was filed on March :23,
2007, and granted by this Court on June 25, 2007. This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1:254(1).
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION
Section 67(e) of the Internal Revenue Code, :26 U.S.C. §
67(e), provides in relevant part:
For purposes of this section, the adjusted gross income
of an estate or trust shall be computed in the same
manner as in the case of an individual, except that(l) the deductions for costs which are paid
or incurred in connection with the administration of the estate or trust and which would not
have been incurred if the property were not
held in such trust or estate...
shall be treated as allowable in arriving at adjusted
gross income.
The full text of 26 U.S.C. § 67 as amended is set out in Appendix A, Appendix ("Pet. Br. App.") 1 a. The full text of 26
U.S.C. § 67 (1986) as originally adopted in the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 is set out in Appendix B, id.
INTRODUCTION
This case concerns whether expenses paid by the trustees
of a nongrantor trust or estate for professional investment
management are deductible in full from the trust’s or estate’s
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income for trust or estate income tax purposes.1 Our position
is that under the clear congressional language of 26 U.S.C. §
67(e), such "investment advice" fees are fully deductible.
The Internal Revenue Code (the "Revenue Code" or the
"Code") has long treated "the trust as an entity for producing
income comparable to a business enterprise.., and permits
deductions of management expenses of the trust. "
Bingham’s Trust v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 374 (1945).
More than thirty years ago, Congress made clear that "costs
paid or incurred in connection with the administration of the
estate or trust" were deductible from trust or estate income much as they are from the income of taxable corporations even when similar fees were not fully deductible from individual income. 26 U.S.C. § 57(b)(2)(B)(i) (1977).
In the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (the "1986 Act" or the
"Act"), Congress added a second clause to this statutory language. The relevant provision, codified at 26 U.S.C. §
67(e)(1), now permits the deduction in full of "costs which
are paid or incurred in connection with the administration of
the estate or trust and which would not have been incurred if
the property were not held in such trust or estate." Id. (emphasis added). If trust and estate investment advice fees are
such costs, they may be deducted in full from trust or estate
1 The statutory provision involved in the question here, 26 U.S.C. §
67(e), applies only to nongrantor trusts, and only such trusts are at issue
in this case. So-called grantor trusts are generally trusts in which the
grantor retains certain powers or interests. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 674(a)
(grantor trust created where grantor retains the authority to determine
who will receive the income or corpus of the trust). They are often utilized for estate planning purposes, but are deemed to have no independent
income tax significance and are disregarded and treated as mere conduits
for income tax purposes. All their income is taxed to their grantor every
year. Cf. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331,335 (1940) (where grantor
retains "dominion and control" over property, he or she remains its
owner); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 371 (1930) (Holmes, J.) ("taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with
the actual command over the property taxed"). Genetic references to
"trusts" throughout this brief refer only to nongrantor trusts.

income for trust or estate income tax purposes. If not, they
are subject to a limitation on deductibility, as similar expenses are under the 1986 Act when incurred by individuals,
a limitation that would result in the reduction of trust corpus
not just once, but year after year. Trust and estate investment advice fees are perhaps the largest single cost involved
in the administration of most trusts and estates. The question
before the Court is therefore one of great significance, particularly for the beneficiaries that trusts and estates are created and designed to protect.
Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue (the
"Commissioner") argues that trust and estate investment advice fees are no longer deductible in full. But there is no indication in the text, structure or history of § 67, the 1986 Act,
or the Code more broadly, that Congress had a purpose to
work such a significant change in the way trusts and estates
are taxed. Rather, as its text makes clear, Congress sought to
ensure full deductibility in § 67 for all costs incurred in the
administration of a trust or estate that are caused by the fact
that the property is held in that trust or estate.
Trust investment advice fees meet that test.2 Such fees
are different in kind from similar fees incurred by individuals. Trust investment advisors must always take into account
the unique fiduciary obligation of the trustee to invest the
trust or estate assets for the benefit of all the beneficiaries in
light of the purposes, terms, distribution requirements and
other circumstances of the particular trust or estate. This
may include among other things balancing competing interests of differently situated beneficiaries. Fees incurred for
such advice are therefore always incurred because assets are
in the trust- the particular type of advice would not have
been needed, and the corresponding fee would not have been
incurred, "if the property were not held in such trust or es2 While the statute is applicable to trusts and estates, this case involves a
trust. References to "trusts" throughout this brief are intended to encompass both trusts and estates unless context indicates otherwise.
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tare." These fees are, therefore, fully deductible under the
statute. This interpretation of § 67(e) is confirmed by the
structure, history and purposes of § 67 and the Internal
Revenue Code more broadly. It is, indeed, the only plausible
reading of the statutory text.
STATEMENT
1. The William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust ("Trust"
or "Rudldn Trust") was established in 1967 under the will of
Henry A. Rudkin, Sr. ("Rudkin" or "Henry Rudldn"). Rudkin, with his wife Margaret, founded Pepperidge Farm,
maker of cookies and other food products. The Trust was
funded with some of the proceeds of the 1961 sale of Pepperidge Farm to the Campbell Soup Company.
The Will and its First Codicil (the "Trust Documents")
require all the trust income to be paid out each year for the
benefit of a class of income beneficiaries. Pet. App. 35a.3
Upon its expiration, "the principal of the trust" will be distributed to certain living descendants of Henry Rudkin (the
remainder beneficiary class). Pet. App. 36a.
The Trust is designed to last for generations. The Trust
expires twenty-one years after the death of the last survivor
of Henry Rudldn’s descendants living at the time of his death
(or, if it occurs earlier, upon the deaths of William L. Rudkin
and all of his descendants). Pet. App. 36a. The youngest of
Rudldn’s descendants who were living at the time of his
death, Katharine Rudkin Allsopp, is now 49 years old. If she

3 The Trustees of the Trust ("Trustees") must pay or apply "so much of
the net income of the trust as [they] deem necessary or desirable in their
discretion for the support, comfort and education" of any or all members
of an income beneficiary class comprising Rudkin’s son William L.
Rudkin, his wife or widow, and his descendants and their spouses, "in
accordance with [the Trustees’] understanding of the individual and varying needs and resources from time to time of the members of such class."
Pet. App. 35a. Any remaining Trust income must be placed into separate
trusts for the individual members of that income beneficiary class. Id.
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lives to be eighty, the Trust will not expire until 2059.4
2. Unlike individuals who often invest their own funds,
putting their assets into a range of mutual funds or other
standard investment vehicles without hiring investment advisors, a trustee who is not an experienced investor is under an
affirmative fiduciary duty to delegate his or her investment
ftmctions to a qualified and competent agent. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule ("Restatement
3d") § 171 cmts. a, f-h, at 140-41,143-45, and § 227 cmt. j,
at 38-41 (1992). A trustee’s failure to obtain competent investment assistance when such assistance is necessary subjects the trustee to the risk of substantial personal liability to
the beneficiaries.5
Because of their fiduciary obligations, many trustees utilize the services of professionals to provide trust investment
management and advisory services. Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") statistics indicate that fees for this purpose may
be the single largest expense connected with the administration of trusts and estates, with several billion dollars in fees

4 The Trust Documents specify that during the pendency of the Trust, the
Trustees retain discretion to distribute principal should they deem it
"necessary or desirable" either "for the education, support, comfort or
welfare" of one or more members of the income beneficiary class, or "to
advance the best interests of such member or members [of that class] in
any business venture in which such member or members may be engaged
or in which such members may wish to engage." Pet. App. 45a-46a. The
Trustees are also required to distribute portions of the trust principal to
any persons or organizations designated by Rudkin’s son William during
his life or in his will if it was duly admitted to probate (except for William Rudkin himself or his estate or their creditors). Pet. App. 36a. At
the beginning of the tax year at issue in this case, 2000, the Trust had
assets worth $2,884,542; at the beginning of the final quarter of that year,
it had assets worth $2,226,222. Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 24, 27.
5 See generally Restatement 3d §§ 205, 208-211, Reporter’s Notes, at
166-173 and cases cited therein (describing the trustee’s liability for both
actual losses and failure to realize the gains that would have been realized if the trust assets had been invested properly).
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paid each year for such services.6
3. The Trustees of the Rudkin Trust ("Trustees") have
unique fiduciary obligations in their management of the
Trust assets:
The Trustees are subject to the Connecticut Uniform
Prudent Investor Act ("UPIA"). Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 45a541a to 45a-541 l. That statute utilizes the "prudent investor"
standard which requires trustees to invest and manage trust
assets "by considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements and other circumstances of the trust," id. § 45a541b(a), and to evaluate "investment and management decisions respecting individual assets.., not in isolation, but in
the context of the trust portfolio as a whole and as a part of
an overall investment strategy having risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust." Id. § 45a-541b(b). The
statute requires the Trustees to consider ten enumerated circumstances in investing and managing Trust assets, including "the nature and estimated duration of the trust." Id. §
45a-541b(c). Conn. Gen. Stat. §45a-541b(c) provides in full:
6 See Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Tax Stats -lncome
from Trusts and Estates ("IRS Tax Stats"), at Table 5 (IRS 2007) (Fiduciary Income Tax Returns, Income, Deductions, and Tax Liability, by
Tax Status, and Size of Gross Income, Filing Year 2005) available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05fd01.xls. The IRS does not publish data
that precisely disaggregate these costs. For the most recently reported
year, IRS data show a total of $5.6 billion in deductions on fiduciary income tax returns for a category known as "other deductions not subject to
the two-percent floor." Id. at col. 32 & n.1. The largest component of
that category was likely deductions for fees for trust and estate investment advisory and management services like the deduction taken here.
The data also show a total of $1.5 billion for what are called "allowable
miscellaneous deductions." Id. at col. 34. Under rulings of the Fourth
and Federal Circuits described below, some trusts and estates categorized
their fees for investment advice in that category, and, again, such fees
were likely the largest single type of deduction within that category.
Finally, the data show $4.0 billion deducted in that one year for trustees’
and other fiduciaries’ fees. Id. at col. 26. These fees, too, are primarily
for investment advice and management. To the extent it is relevant to
this case, these categories will be described more fully below.
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Among circumstances that a trustee shall consider in
investing and managing trust assets are such of the following as are relevant to the trust or its beneficiaries:
(1) General economic conditions; (2) the possible effect of inflation or deflation; (3) the expected tax consequences of investment decisions, strategies and distributions; (4) the role that each investment or course
of action plays within the overall trust portfolio, which
may include financial assets, interests in closely held
enterprises, tangible and intangible personal property
and real property; (5) the expected total return from income and the appreciation of capital; (6) related trusts
and other income and resources of the beneficiaries;
(7) needs for liquidity, for regularity of income and for
preservation or appreciation of capital; (8) an asset’s
special relationship or special value, if any, to the purposes of the trust or to one or more of the beneficiaries;
(9) the size of the portfolio; and (10) the nature and estimated duration of the trust.
The State of Connecticut monitors the Trustees’ compliance with their obligations. The Connecticut Probate Court
has appointed a guardian ad litem to protect the interests of
the unborn beneficiaries of the Trust. See Estate of Henry A.
Rudkin, Order of the Probate Court for the District of Fairfield, Fairfield Probate Court Records, Vol. 288, p. 644 (December 21, 1970). The Trustees are required to file a detailed principal and income trust accounting with the guardian and the Probate Court every three years. See Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 45a-177.
3. The "prudent investor" standard has been adopted in
all 50 States and the District of Columbia] That standard
7 Versions of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act have been adopted by 44
States and the District of Columbia. See Uniform Law Commission, A
Few Facts About the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, http://www.
nccusl.org/update/uniformact_factsheets/uniforrnacts- fs-upria.asp (last
visited Aug. 17, 2007) (listing States). Five of the remaining States have
adopted versions of the prudent investor standard. See Del. Code. Ann.
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does not allow the Trustees to invest the Trust assets as individuals would, or do, invest their own assets. Thus, for instance, an inexperienced investor, or one not wishing to devote time to learning about different investment altematives
and monitoring their status on an ongoing basis, may reasonably decide to invest his or her own funds solely in "safe"
investments such as Treasury obligations, high-quality taxexempt municipal bonds, or federally-insured savings accounts. If he or she were a trustee, however, that same
course of decision would likely breach the fiduciary duty.8
Similarly, an individual may reasonably decide to concentrate his or her personal investments in a single class of
stocks or securities because he or she is particularly knowledgeable about or impressed by investments in that area. He
or she may not do so as trustee, however, even if he or she is
tit. 12, § 3302 (2007); Fla. Star. § 518.11 (2007); Ga. Code Ann. § 53-12287 (2007); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2127 (2007); N.Y. Est. Powers &
Trusts Law § 11-2.3 (2007). In Kentucky, the prudent investor standard
is applicable only in certain circumstances. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§
286.3-277, 386.454(1), 386.502 (2006).
The universal adoption of the prudent investor standard marks the
rejection of the traditional "prudent person" rule, see Harvard College v.
Amory, 26 Mass. 446, 469 (1830), as a description of fiduciary obligation. The prudent person standard had been criticized by "scholars and
practitioners familiar with modem portfolio theory." See Sehanzenbaeh
and Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent Trust Investment Laws Change Trust
Portfolio Allocation?, 50 J. L & Econ. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at
5-9, available at http://papers.ssm.corn/sol3/papers.efm?abstract_id=
=868761). "Assessing the prudence of a particular investment . . . requires consideration of the portfolio as a whole, the beneficiary’s tolerance of risk, and the purpose of the trust .... [Investments] favored under the old prudent [person] rule[] expose[d] the trust fund to considerable inflation risk." Id. at 8.
8 See Restatement 3d § 227 cmt. e, illus. 11, at 22 (not "prudent" to invest solely in short-term bank and federal obligations); Baker Boyer Nat’l
Bank v. Garver, 719 P.2d 583 (Wash. Ct. App.), review denied, 106
Wash. 2d 1017 (1986) (not "prudent" to invest solely in tax exempt securities); Hurst v. Security-First Nat’l Bank (In re Bouffleur’s Estate), 26
Cal. Rptr. 173 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (not "prudent" to invest solely in
building and loan savings accounts not exceeding $10,000).
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seeking the same financial result, and even if he or she has
"made his [or her] own fortune" from such investments.9
Nor may the fact that the trust property is not diversified
when originally placed in the trust, or that the particular trust
instrument permits investments otherwise generally considered inappropriate for trusts, relieve the trustee of his or her
duty to prudently diversify the trust investments.I° Likewise,
the inclusion of an investment or type of investment in a
statutory "legal list" of investments permitted to fiduciaries
does not relieve the fiduciary of the duty to invest prudently,
including on a diversified basis, in such permitted investments. 11
Further, an otherwise "prudent" investment may become
imprudent in light of changing circumstances, including the
nature and mix of other investments in the trust’s portfolio,
the availability of other possible investments, and the safety,
stability and profitability of the instrument, entity or industry
in which the trust has invested. Thus, while an individual is
free to leave investments largely unattended over time, the
trustee’s fiduciary duty requires ongoing monitoring and
analysis of the trust’s investments and the investment market
generally in order to ensure that the trust portfolio retains a
properly diversified balance of expected risks and returns to
provide for the interests of the various beneficiaries.12
9 See Restatement 3d § 227 cmt. e, illus. 12, at 23; Buder v. Sartore, 774
P.2d 1383, 1386 (Colo. 1989) (under the "prudent investor" rule, "[t]he
trustee may not subject his trust property to hazards which a man dealing
with his own property might consider warranted if to do so would create
danger to the trust estate").
10 Restatement 3d § 228 cmt. f, at 106 ("IT]he fact that an investment is
permitted does not relieve the trustee of the fundamental duty to act with
prudence. The fiduciary must still exercise care, skill and caution in
making decisions to acquire or retain the investment.").
~ See Restatement 3d § 228 cmt. c, at 102-103.
lz See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 231 cmt. b, at 551 (1959); Restatement 3d § 227 cmt. d, at 14 and cmt. e, at 20; Bogert, The Law of
Trusts and Trustees, § 612 at 20 (3d ed. 2000).
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Trustees, unlike individuals, must also ordinarily invest
in a way that balances the interests of the various beneficiaries and that takes account of other parameters like the duration of the trust and its purposes.13 Trustees owe a duty not
merely to the trust’s remainder beneficiaries to grow the
principal through appreciation, but to the current, future and
contingent income beneficiaries as well to earn income required to serve the trust’s purposes. That dual duty is one of
the strongest known in the law. As then-Chief Judge Cardozo said in the classic explication of the fiduciary duty under the common law, and as this Court is well aware:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday
world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to
those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place.
Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to
this there has developed a tradition that is unbending
and inveterate.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.).
4. Trusts and estates, like individuals and certain other
entities, must pay a tax upon their "taxable income." See 26
U.S.C. § l(e). Trusts and estates with income above a certain level must file a Form 1041, U.S. Income Tax Return for
Estates and Trusts, called a fiduciary income tax return.
Taxable income for both individuals and trusts is derived,
first, by taking "gross income," defined as "all income from
whatever source derived," 26 U.S.C. § 61(a), and deducting
in full certain expenses that are enumerated by statute (called
"above-the-line" deductions) in order to arrive at a figure for
"adjusted gross income" ("AGI"). See 26 U.S.C. § 62(a).
Taxable income is calculated by subtracting from AGI other
deductions that are also enumerated by statute. These are
See Restatement 3d § 227 cmt. i, at 32-38.
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called "itemized" or "below-the-line" deductions. See 26
U.S.C. § 67(b) and Code sections cited therein.
Since the adoption of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, a
subset of these itemized deductions, called "miscellaneous
itemized deductions," has been deductible by individuals
only to the extent that these deductions’ aggregate "exceeds
2 percent of adjusted gross income." 26 U.S.C. § 67(a).14
These miscellaneous itemized deductions are, in other words,
no longer fully deductible; the 1986 Act imposed a threshold, referred to among tax specialists as the "two-percent
floor," on their deductibility. Congress limited the deductibility of these miscellaneous itemized deductions to prevent
taxpayers from deducting expenses with "characteristics of
voluntary personal expenditures," S. Rep. 99-313 at 78
(1986), that lacked "a sufficient business or investment purpose." Id. at 78 n.18; H.R. Rep. 99-426 at 109 n.8 (1985).
Many expenses are, of course, deductible in our net-incomebased system of taxation because "they may constitute costs
of earning income." H.R. Rep. 99-426 at 110. But Congress
was concerned that individuals were erroneously claiming
deductions for things like home office expenses, magazine
subscriptions and safe deposit services, and deducting items
with "’personal" aspects that "would have been incurred apart
from any business or investment activities of the taxpayer."
S. Rep. 99-313 at 78-79 & n.18; H.R. Rep. 99-426 at 109
n.8. Congress was also concerned about the recordkeeping
and auditing burdens for both individuals and the IRS involved in assuring that these deductions were not taken erroneously. See S. Rep. 99-313 78-79 & n.18 (1986); H.R.
Rep. 99-426 109-110 & n.8 (1985). The two-percent floor is
a rough way of eliminating the personal component from an
individual’s deductions without the IRS having to make detailed, fact-intensive inquiries unwarranted by the sums in14 These "miscellaneous itemized deductions" include those itemized
deductions not listed in 26 U.S.C. § 67(b). There are over fifty such miscellaneous itemized deductions listed throughout the Code.
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volved in each case.
The Code permits both individuals and trusts and estates
an itemized deduction for investment management and advisory fees.~5 Individuals, however, may not ordinarily deduct
investment management and advisory fees in full in calculating their taxable income. Rather, under Treasury Regulations such fees are treated as "miscellaneous itemized deductions" that are subject to the two-percent floor. See 26 CFR
1.67-1 T(a)(1 )(ii) (1988).
The Internal Revenue Code, however, has long recognized that the tax treatment of expenses of trusts and estates
does not present the same concerns as the tax treatment of
expenses of individuals. Thus, for example, in the preexisting law in place at the time the 1986 Act was passed, all
"costs incurred in connection with the administration of
trusts and estates," including investment advice fees, were
deductible by trusts and estates in arriving at AGI. 26 U.S.C.
§ 57(b)(2) (1977). That is, these costs were given an "abovethe-line" deduction though similar costs incurred by individuals were not. Below-the-line deductions are not allowable in calculating something called the Alternative Mimimum Tax (AMT), which becomes payable when one’s income tax would otherwise fall below a level set by statute.
Above-the-line deductions are. This provision of law therefore meant that these costs were deductible for trusts and estates required to pay AMT, but that similar ones were not
deductible by individuals required to do the same.
In the 1986 Act, in the same section of the Code where it
imposed the two-percent floor, Congress, consistent with this
prior approach, thus provided a special rule for trusts and
estates for the tax treatment of certain costs. The 1986 Act
provided, in language codified at 26 U.S.C. § 67(e), that:
15 See 26 U.S.C. § 212(2) ("In the case of an individual, there shall be
allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred.., for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income... "); 26 CFR 1.212-1 (g).
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the adjusted gross income of an estate or trust shall be
computed in the same manner as in the case of an individual, except that the deductions for costs which are
paid or incurred in connection with the administration
of the estate or trust and which would not have been
incurred if the property were not held in such trust or
estate shall be treated as allowable in arriving at adjusted gross income.
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 132(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2114-15
(1986), Pet. Br. App. 6a-7a.
Section 67(e) thus creates an exception to the twopercent floor for certain deductions of trusts and estates. To
come within that exception, a cost must fall within each of
the two clauses, or prongs, of the statute: First, it must be a
"cost[] which [is] paid or incurred in connection with the
administration of the estate or trust"; and second, it must be
one "which would not have been incurred if the property
were not held in such trust or estate." (The fact that § 67(e)
treats these costs as deductible in calculating AGI, that is, as
"above the line" deductions, means that they will reduce not
only ordinary income tax, but the AMT where it is applicable. It is thus also the successor provision to the former §
57(b)(2) described above.)
5. The Trustees here themselves lack the skills and training necessary to make the investment decisions required by
their fiduciary obligations. In order to comply with these
obligations, the Trustees therefore engaged Warfield Associates, Inc., ("Warfield"), an SEC registered investment advisor in New York, to manage the Trust assets.16 Wariield
charged the Trust an annual fee of 0.8% of Trust assets,
billed quarterly. During 2000, the tax year at issue here,
16 The Trust Documents provide that the Trustees may "employ such
agents, experts and counsel as they may deem advisable in connection
with the administration and management" of the Trust. Pet. App. 41a.
This delegation is expressly permitted by the Connecticut statute, see
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-541i(a).
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Warfield charged, and the Trustees paid, quarterly fees totaling $22,241.31 for Warfield’s services. J.A. 24-27. In calculating the Trust’s taxable income on the Trust’s Form
1041, the Trustees included a deduction for the full amount
of Warfield’s fees because they were costs incurred in connection with the Trust’s administration that "would not have
been incurred if the property were not held" in the Rudkin
Trust. J.A. 12 (line 15a), 13.
Respondent, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ("the
Commissioner"), disallowed this full deduction, permitting
the Trust to deduct these fees only to the extent that they exceeded two percent of the Trust’s adjusted gross income.17
The parties agree that fees paid for investment management
and advisory services are "costs which are paid or incurred
in connection with the administration of the estate or trust"
within the meaning of the first prong of § 67(e).18 In the
Commissioner’s view, however, these fees failed to meet the
statute’s second prong. He issued a Notice of Deficiency to
the Trust in the amount of $4,448.19
Petitioner Trustee Michael J. Knight petitioned the Tax
Court for a redetermination of deficiency. See 26 U.S.C. §§
6212, 6213, 6214 and 7442. The Tax Court sustained the
Commissioner’s position in reliance on its previous decision
in O’Neill v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 227 (1992), rev’d 994
F.2d 302 (CA6 1993). The Sixth Circuit in fact reversed in
O’Neill, holding that "certain expenditures unique to trust
administration are excepted from the two percent floor" by §
17 The Trust had no other miscellaneous itemized deductions subject to
the two-percent floor that could have been aggregated with these costs.
See J.A. 12.
18 See Pet. App. 6a; Ungermann Trust v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1131
(1983) (a very broad range of costs are included within the universe of
costs covered by this statutory language).
19 The parties subsequently discovered and agree that there was an error
of approximately $11,000 in the calculation of adjusted gross income in
the Trust’s return. The amount of the alleged deficiency, though, was
ultimately not altered by this correction. See Pet. App. 3a.
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67(e), 994 F.3d at 303 (emphasis in original). The court of
appeals there concluded that the trust investment advice fees
at issue were among them because "the investment advisor
fees paid by the Trust were costs incurred because the property was held in trust." Id. at 304. As the court explained,
the costs were "caused by the fiduciary duties of the cotrustees .... [F]iduciaries uniquely occupy a position of trust
for others and have an obligation to the beneficiaries to exercise proper skill and care with the assets of the trust." Id.
The Tax Court, however, chose to follow the decisions of
the Federal Circuit in Mellon Bank, N.A. v. United States,
265 F.3d 1275 (CAFed 2001), and the Fourth Circuit in Scott
v. United States, 328 F.3d 132 (CA4 2003).2o In those cases,
those two courts of appeals concluded that only costs of a
type not "customarily" or "commonly" incurred by individuals were fully deductible by trusts and estates. 265 F.3d at
1281 (costs that "that are unique to the administration of a
trust and not customarily incurred outside of trusts"); 328
F.3d at 139-140 (quoting this language then equating it with
a rule that "expenses commonly incurred by individual taxpayers" are not fully deductible). The Tax Court concluded
that its original opinion in O’Neill, echoed by the Federal
and Fourth Circuits in Mellon Bank and Scott, "remain[ed]
sound." Pet. App. 29a.
~i. Petitioner appealed to the Second Circuit. Before that
court, the Commissioner relied upon Scott and Mellon Bank,
contending that costs incurred in connection with the administration of trusts and estates are fully deductible only if
they are not "commonly" or "customarily" incurred by individual taxpayers. Brief for Appellee at 3-4, 22-24, Testamentary Trust of William L. Rudkin v. Commissioner, 467
F.3d 149 (CA2 2006) (No. 05-5151-ag) ("Gov’t CA2 Br.")
(quoting Scott and Mellon Bank); see also id. at 22 (arguing
20 The Tax Court deems itself bound to follow the decisions of a Circuit
Court of Appeals only when an appeal in the case before it lies to the
same court. See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970).
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that the statute "treats as fully deductible only those trustrelated administrative expenses that are not natural, customary, or probable outside of the context of trusts."). The
Commissioner has long and repeatedly argued that "if a
trust-related administrative expense is also customarily or
habitually incurred outside of trusts, then it is subject to the
two-percent floor." Brief for Appellee at 27, Mellon Bank v.
United States, 265 F.3d 1275 (CAFed 2001) (No. 01-5015)
("Govt. Mellon Br."); Brief for Appellee at 27, Scott v.
United States, 328 F.3d 132 (CA4 2003) (No. 02-1464)
("Govt. Scott Br.").
A two-judge panel of the Second Circuit affirmed, but on
reasoning that differed from that of the Tax Court, that urged
by the Commissioner, or that adopted by any of the three
courts of appeals to have decided the issue previously, each
of whose reasoning the court below rejected.21 The court
concluded that the "plain meaning" of the statute "excludes
from full deduction those costs of a type that could be incurred if the property were held individually rather than in
trust." Pet. App. l la (emphasis in original); see also Pet.
App. 12a-13a. Applying that test, the court ruled that "’investment-advice fees are.., a cost that individual taxpayers
are capable of incurring. Investment-advice fees and other
costs that individual taxpayers are capable of incurring are,
therefore, not fully deductible pursuant to § 67(e)(1) when
incurred by a trust." Pet. App. 12a.
The court of appeals subsequently denied rehearing and
rehearing en banc, Pet. App. 31a-32a, and on June 25, 2007,
this Court granted certiorari.
7. After this Court granted certiorari in this case, the
Commissioner issued a proposed regulation under the authority of 26 U.S.C. § 7805, purporting to interpret § 67(e).
72 Fed. Reg. 41,243, 41,245 (July 27, 2007), Appendix C,
21 Judge Sotomayor wrote the opinion, joined by Judge Hall; Judge
Feinberg, who was originally on the panel, recused himself after oral
argument. See Pet. App. 2a n.*.
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Pet. Br. App. 8a-15a (text of notice of proposed rulemaking
and notice of public hearing, including full text of proposed
regulation 26 CFR 1.67-4).22 The proposed regulation says
that only expenses that are "unique to" trusts and estates are
fully deductible, but, remarkably, it defines "unique" to
mean that only costs that "could not have" been incurred by
an individual "in connection with property not held in an estate or trust" are fully deductible. Id. at 13a (Proposed 26
CFR 1.67-4(b)) (emphasis added). That is, the Commissioner has abandoned his longstanding position that the
statutory language means that only costs of a type not
"commonly" or "customarily" incurred outside trusts are
fully deductible. The Commissioner now proposes a position similar to that adopted by the Second Circuit below, that
the phrase "would not have been incurred if the property
were not held in such trust and estate" should be read to
mean "could not have been incurred by an individual." The
proposed regulation does not mention or address the fact that
this is a departure from the Commissioner’s longstanding
position with respect to the interpretation of the statute.23
Under the proposed regulation, the Commissioner appears to take the position for the first time that the costs for
some trust investment fees are, indeed, deductible in full.
The only investment advisory fees that the proposed regulation states it would subject to the two-percent floor are fees
paid for "advice on investing for total return," that is investing to achieve the largest return without regard to whether
that return is the result of production of income or apprecia-

22 The Commissioner informed the Court prior to the grant of certiorari in
this case that issuance of a proposed regulation was imminent. See Brief
of Respondent in Opposition ("Opp.") at 5-6 (stating that a notice of proposed rulemaking "should be ready for publication in the Federal Register by July 2007").
23 The notice of proposed rulemaking also does not mention the grant of
certiorari in this case, but only the need to resolve the Circuit split on the
question presented. Pet. Br. App. 10a-I la.
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tion of principal.24 Pet. Br. App. 14a (Proposed 26 CFR
1.67-4(b)). The proposed regulation specifies that there are
circumstances in which only a "portion... of the . . . investment advisory" fee may be subject under the regulation
to the two-percent floor. Id. 15a (Proposed 26 CFR 1.674(c)).
Under modern portfolio theory, individuals are supposed
to invest for "total return," but many trusts and estates traditionally could not because of their need for both income and
growth of principal in order to "balance the competing interests of differently situated beneficiaries." Restatement 3d §
227 cmt. c, at 13. Thus, "only when beneficial rights do not
turn on a distinction between income and principal is the
trustee allowed to focus on total return.., without regard to
the income component of that return." Id. cmt. i, at 35 (emphasis added). See also id. §§ 183,232, 239, 240 (describing
duty of trustee to deal impartially with beneficiaries and to
balance income and principal to serve interests of successive
beneficiaries ).
The line proposed by the Commissioner indicates that he
now recognizes that trust investment advice fees are not subject to the two-percent floor when they purchase advice
about investing in a manner distinct from that undertaken by
individuals. See also Pet. App. Br. 13a (determination of
deductibility under the proposed regulation turns on "the
type of product or service rendered to the estate or trust").
As described above, they always do.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Like other significant income producing entities, trusts
and estates have long been permitted to deduct for income
tax purposes investment advice fees paid to assist with the
management of property held for the production of income.
That rule comports with the Revenue Code’s broad basic
policy to tax only net income. Section 67(e) preserved trus24 See Restatement 3d § 227 cmt. e, at 18 (defining investment for ’~total
return").
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tees’ ability to do so. That construction is confirmed by the
text, structure and history of the section, the Act in which it
was adopted, and the Code of which it is a part. There is no
basis for the assertion that Congress intended in § 67(e) to
work the significant change to trust and estate taxation that
the Commissioner posits, a change that would have serious
consequences for the very beneficiaries trusts and estates are
designed to protect.
I. 26 U.S.C. § 67(e) requires a determination of whether
costs incurred in connection with the administration of a trust
or estate "would not have been incurred if the property were
not held in such trust or estate." This is a straightforward
causation test. It means that all expenses that are caused by
the fact that the property is held in the trust or estate are deductible in full. Trust investment advice fees are caused by
the fact the property is held in trust. They are incurred in
fulfillment of the trustee’s unique fiduciary duty, a duty not
applicable to individuals investing their own funds. The advice for which trustees pay is tailored precisely to the distinctive requirements imposed by that fiduciary duty. By
contrast, costs that would be identical regardless of whether
the property was owned by an individual or a trust, for example expenses for routine maintenance of real property, are
subject to the two-percent floor. This is not only the best
reading of the statute’s text, it provides a rule that fits coherently within the Internal Revenue Code, serves the purposes
intended by Congress, and is workable and fair.
The text and structure of the Revenue Code, the 1986
Act, and § 67 itself confirm this reading. Section 67 was intended to subject expenses with a "personal" aspect to the
two-percent floor. Trust investment advice fees do not have
this aspect. Congress also did not intend to impose the twopercent floor on trust and estate investment advice expenses
to prevent individuals from establishing trusts and estates to
circumvent the two-percent floor that would otherwise apply
to their deductions. Congress recognized that trusts and estates are not subject to such abuse, and indeed, its consistent
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provision, both before and since the 1986 Act, of deductions
for costs incurred in connection with the administration of
trusts and estates demonstrates that Congress is not concerned about their misuse in that way. It makes the most
sense therefore to read § 67(e) to preserve the full deductibility of trust and estate investment advice fees, perhaps the
largest single cost incurred in connection with trust and estate administration, rather than to work the significant
change to their tax treatment urged by the Commissioner.
II. Because the statute has a plain meaning, and no other
textually supportable interpretation of § 67(e) has been proposed, this Court need not employ the tools used for addressing statutory ambiguity. However, if the statute were found
to be ambiguous, applicable rules of interpretation would
support Petitioner’s reading. The legislative history of § 67
confirms that Congress did not intend the two-percent floor
to apply broadly to trust and estate administrative expenses
and that the primary purpose of the limitation in § 67(e) was
to address the administrative expenses associated with what
is called a "pass-through entity" (for example a parmership)
that happens to be owned by a trust or estate. Administrative
costs of pass-through entities are not fully deductible when
such entities are owned by individuals, and the legislative
history of § 67(e) makes clear that the specific purpose of
that provision was to ensure that they likewise cannot be
fully deducted when the pass-through entity happens to be
owned by a trust or estate. Further, if the statute were ambiguous, under a venerable canon of construction it would be
necessary to resolve any doubt "against the Government and
in favor of the taxpayer." United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S.
179, 188 (1923).
III. Any construction of the statute under which trust investment management fees are not deductible in full would
violate the congressional purpose and would do grave harm
both to those who are the beneficiaries of trusts and estates
and to the financial services industry by discouraging trustees from engaging the services of precisely the professional
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advisors best able to assist them with fulfillment of their fiduciary obligations. This Congress cannot have silently intended.
IV. Only Petitioner’s interpretation of the statute offers a
coherent approach to the Commissioner’s longstanding
treatment of costs incurred in connection with the administration of trusts and estates. The Commissioner has long
taken the position that fees for the preparation of fiduciary
income tax returns (but not parallel individual returns) and
trust attorney fees (but not individuals’ attorney fees), among
others, are fully deductible and not subject to the two-percent
floor. This can be explained only by the relationship of
those particular expenses to the fulfillment of the trustee’s
fiduciary duty. The same rule should apply with respect to
trust investment fees, recognizing their full deducibility because they are, like those other expenses, caused by the fact
that the property is held in the trust.
V. The statutory language will not support any of the
other proposed readings of § 67(e). The Commissioner’s
new proposed interpretation is obviously textually unsupportable. "Would not have been incurred" simply does not
mean "could not have been incurred." In addition, the bewildering difficulty of case-by-case factual determinations
and corresponding detailed recordkeeping and auditing under
the test now proposed by the Commissioner is utterly contrary to the purpose of § 67 to reduce such costs. The position taken by the Fourth and Federal Circuits, asking not
whether a cost actually would "have been incurred if the
property were not held in such trust or estate," but whether
that type of cost is commonly incurred outside of trusts, is,
similarly, both countertextual and unworkable in application.
VI. Finally, even under the test adopted by the Fourth
and Federal Circuits or the one now proposed by the Commissioner, the trust investment fees in this case would not be
subject to the two-percent floor, but would be fully deductible. Individuals do not "customarily" or "commonly" place
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assets under management, paying a percentage-of-assets
management fee. Further, trust investment fees are peculiar
to trusts and estates and cannot be incurred by individuals.
Even under the principle articulated in the Commissioner’s
proposed regulation, the trust investment advice fees in this
case would be fully deductible.
ARGUMENT
I. EXPENSES CAUSED BY THE FACT THAT THE
PROPERTY IS HELD IN TRUST, INCLUDING THE
TRUST INVESTMENT ADVICE FEES AT ISSUE
HERE, ARE FULLY DEDUCTIBLE UNDER § 67(e).
A. The Text of § 67(e) Establishes a Straightforward
Causation Test Readily Satisfied Here.
Section 67(e) permits the deductibility in full of "costs
which are paid or incurred in connection with the administration of the estate or trust and which would not have been incurred if the property were not held in such trust or estate."
26 U.S.C. § 67(e). This establishes a straightforward causation test. The text’s plain meaning requires an inquiry into
whether a particular expense of a particular trust or estate
was caused by the fact that the property was held in the trust
or estate.
Applying this test, the trust investment advice fees at issue in this case are deductible in full. Trust investment advice fees are caused by the fact that property is held in the
trust. They are incurred in fulfillment of the trustee’s fiduciary obligation, and the advice for which they pay is tailored
precisely to the distinctive requirements imposed by that fiduciary duty. The trust investment management fees in this
case, for example, were incurred in order to obtain advice on
investing trust assets in compliance with the Trustees’ particular fiduciary duties. They purchased something different
from similar costs that might have been incurred by an individual. The fees therefore would not have been incurred had
the property not been held in trust.
An individual may incur a similar type of cost, but an
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individual will not incur the trust investment advice costs
that are incurred by a trustee to ensure that he or she meets
his or her fiduciary responsibilities. The statute does not ask
whether similar costs are capable of being incurred by individuals or whether similar costs are customarily or commonly incurred by individuals. Rather, the statute asks
whether these costs would have been incurred if the property
were not held in this trust. The trust investment fees at issue
here would not have been.
This common-sense approach to the statute creates a
bright-line rule that Congress plainly intended. On one side
of the line are costs caused by the fact that the property is
held in the trust or estate. These remain fully deductible. On
the other side are costs that would have been incurred regardless of who owned the property held in trust - for example, expenses for routine maintenance of real property when
it happens to be owned by a trust but could equally have
been owned by an individual. In that situation, the expenses
are identical regardless of whether the owner is an individual
or a trust or estate and in either event they are subject to the
two-percent floor. Similarly, the expenses § 67(e) was in
fact specifically designed to subject to the two-percent floor,
administrative costs associated with certain entities such as
parmerships in which a trust or estate, like an individual,
may have ownership interests, see infra at 32-36, are identical whether the property (there the partnership interest) happens to be owned by an individual or by a trust or estate.
(Those costs of what are called "pass-through" entities, ineluding partnerships, will be explained in more detail be-

low.)
B. The Text and Structure of the Revenue Code, the 1986
Act, and § 67 Itself Confirm This Reading.
This reading of § 67(e) is confirmed by the legislative
history of both § 67(a), imposing the two-percent floor, and
§ 67(e) itself. See infra 31-38 (discussing legislative history). But this Court need not resort to legislative history,
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because only this reading of § 67(e) is consistent with the
text and structure of the Revenue Code, the 1986 Act and the
other provisions of § 67.
1. Expenses Caused by the Fact Property is Held in the
Trust or Estate Lack the Personal Character of the
Expenses Whose Deduetibility Congress Sought to
Limit With the Two-Percent Floor Adopted in § 67.
The purposes for which the two-percent floor itself was
adopted would not be served by imposing it on the costs at
issue here.
The Revenue Code reflects a broad basic policy to tax
net income. Accordingly, costs like investment management
fees, which contribute to the production of income, have
long been deductible from the income of individuals and entities alike for income tax purposes. And even when Congress has found reason to limit the deductibility of such costs
for individuals, it has retained them for entities like trusts
and estates. Thus, before 1986, though Congress had limited
the deductibility of such expenses for individuals in calculating their Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), it preserved the
principle of their deductibility in the same circumstances for
trusts and estates. See supra at 12.
The two-percent floor was concerned with addressing
abuse and misapplication of the net income system by individuals. It was included in a Title of the Act entitled "Individual Income Tax Provisions," see 100 Stat. at 2085, and
the specific provision imposing it, § 67(a), entitled "General
Rule," states that "in the case of an individual, the miscellaneous itemized deductions for any taxable year shall be allowed only to the extent that the aggregate of such deductions exceeds 2 percent of adjusted gross income." See id. at
2114, Pet. Br. App. 5a (emphasis added).
As the placement of section 67 in the Act indicates, this
two-percent floor is essentially a rule for individuals, and it
arises from issues peculiar to individual taxpayers. The twopercent floor was adopted out of a concern that individual
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taxpayers were frequently deducting expenses with some
"voluntary personal" characteristic, erroneously claiming
deductions or deducting expenses that would have been incurred even if they did not contribute to the taxpayer’s income-producing activities. See Staff of the Joint Committee
on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of
1986 at 78 (1987) (hereinafter "Blue Book"); see FPC v.
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 411 U.S. 458,472 (1973)
(such a General Explanation provides "a compelling contemporary indication" of the meaning of a statute). This included expenses such as education expenses, subscriptions to
business or trade journals, and safe-deposit box fees for
boxes that could hold both personal and investment-related
items. See Blue Book at 78-79 & n.52.
The two-percent floor on deductions served as a kind of
"rough justice" disallowing a fixed part of an individual’s
miscellaneous itemized deductions in the aggregate on the
theory that some portion of the expenses were actually personal in character. It employed the two-percent floor rather
than requiring case-by-case determinations in order to reduce
the burden upon the IRS and the individual taxpayer imposed
by the need to verify that individuals’ miscellaneous itemized deductions were properly claimed. Blue Book at 78.
On its face, the text of the proviso in § 67(e), too, reveals a
purpose to address expenses with a personal aspect, subjecting to the floor costs that would "have been incurred if the
property not been held in such trust or estate." Cf. Blue
Book at 79 ("The use of a deduction floor.., takes into account that some miscellaneous expenses are sufficiently personal in nature that they would be incurred apart from any
business or investment activities of the taxpayer.")
Applying the two-percent floor to distinct costs that are
incurred to satisfy the fiduciary requirements imposed on the
trustee would not serve the purpose for which § 67(a) and (e)
were designed. These trust expenses do not have a voluntary
or personal aspect. Investment fees incurred by trusts are
properly treated categorically as a legitimate business ex-
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pense of discharging the fiduciary duty to prudently invest
trust assets. They are mandated by the existence of the trust
fiduciary relationship, and serve only the fiduciary purpose
of the trust. See supra at 5-10. A limitation on their deductibility would thus be beyond the scope of Congress’s
purpose in enacting § 67.
2. The Text and Structure of the 1986 Act and the
Code More Broadly Demonstrate a Purpose to Retain
the Type of Deduction at Issue Here, Not to Restrict It.
Consistent with this, the text and structure of the 1986
Act and the Code more broadly demonstrate a purpose to
retain the deductibility of fees like those at issue here, not to
limit it.
a. Other taxable entities, for example taxable corporations, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), and so on, are
permitted to deduct for income tax purposes similar investment management fees.25 This is consistent with the basic
policy of taxing net income. Congress has recognized that
trusts and estates, like these others, are meaningful entities
with substantial economic and societal purposes, and so it
makes sense that the deductibility of trust and estate investment advice fees should have been preserved by § 67(e), not
limited by it.
Trusts and estates are created by the transfer of assets to
a third-party trustee who holds, manages and controls the
trust property for the benefit of others, the beneficiaries. Individuals create trusts (and estates) to provide for others and
to give them protection. The beneficiaries may, as in this
case, include a large number of distinct individuals as well as
individuals who are not even yet born.
Trusts and estates thus have substantial economic and
societal purposes, including the independent management of
25 Taxable corporations and REITs, for example, may deduct such fees as
ordinary and necessary trade or business expenses under 26 U.S.C. §
162.
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trust assets in the interests of the beneficiaries. Trusts’ ability to earn income serves their legitimate societal purposes.
Consequently, as this Court explained long ago, the Code
"treats the trust as an entity for producing income comparable to a business enterprise . . . and permits deductions of
management expenses of the trust..." Bingham’s Trust v.
Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 374 (1945). The Code has set
up a unique system for trust and estate income taxation in
their own right that differs from that applicable to individuals. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 641, et seq. (Subchapter J of Chapter 1
of Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code).
b. The Commissioner does not deny this, nor does he
suggest there is any reason Congress would have wanted to
impose a two-percent floor on deductibility of trust and estate investment advice fees for its own sake. The Commissioner argues, rather, that Congress imposed this new restriction in 1986 to prevent individuals from abusing trusts and
estates by shifting income, placing assets and expenses into
trusts and estates to circumvent the two-percent floor that
would be applicable to them as individuals. Brief of Respondent in Opposition ("Opp.") at 12.
This argument is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of trusts and estates, of their vulnerability to abuse, and
of the design of the Code. The text and structure of the Code
and the 1986 Act make clear that § 67(e) should be read as a
provision preserving the ability of trusts and estates to deduct in full most of the costs incurred in connection with
their administration, not as a provision preventing the full
deduction of what is perhaps the largest single such cost.
There are substantial costs and serious consequences to
creating and administering an estate or nongrantor trust (the
only kind to which § 67(e) applies) that prevent the creation
of a trust (or estate) in order to avoid income taxation in the
way the Commissioner posits. Congress has repeatedly recognized these consequences. They militate against the
Commissioner’s reading of § 67(e).
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First, there is a tax cost: The grantor, the person who creates the trust, will ordinarily have to pay a significant transfer tax that diminishes the assets. 26 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2502.
Second, the grantor loses ownership of and control over assets placed in the trust; the transfer of assets to a nongrantor
trust is irrevocable. Management of the assets is committed
to the trustee, not the grantor or beneficiaries, and the trustee
is not permitted to manage the property as the grantor would.
See supra 7-10. In addition, a trust or estate has greater
costs for recordkeeping, judicial accountings, and the like.
The costs of creating an estate are even greater: One
must also die in order to do so. While they are lumped together in the popular imagination, we are confident no one
yet has chosen death over taxes. Yet § 67 applies not only to
trusts, but to estates. Given the attendant costs, it is implausible that one would create a trust (or estate) in order to obtain a reduction of adjusted gross income (not a direct reduction of taxes), equal to, at most, two percent of AGI. That
tail simply cannot wag the massive dog of nongrantor trust
or estate creation.
c. More significantly, several other provisions in the
Code and, indeed, in the 1986 Act itself, demonstrate that
Congress was not concerned with income shifting through
the use of nongrantor trusts and estates.
In the 1986 Act, Congress actually included a different
provision - § 67(c) - to prevent the kind of income-shifting
abuse the Commissioner claims § 67(e) targets. Congress
identified the entities that it determined were subject to such
abuse, and it expressly excluded trusts and estates from that
list. There is a category of entities known as "pass-through"
entities, common examples of which are parmerships and S
corporations. Such entities are not distinct taxpayers; they
do not pay tax on their income, but pass their own income
through to their owners who pay income tax upon it. See,
e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 701 ("A partnership as such shall not be
subject to the income tax imposed by this chapter. Persons
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carrying on business as partners shall be liable for income
tax only in their separate or individual capacities.") Each
owner’s share of the entity’s income is reported on a Schedule (ordinarily, a "Schedule K-I") that the entity provides to
the owner.
If a pass-through entity could deduct something from its
income that an individual could not deduct, and then pass its
new, reduced net income figure through to its owner, and if it
were relatively cost-free to create such an entity, individuals
could avoid some of their individual income tax by placing
their assets in such pass-through entities. An owner might
deliberately shift income and expenses to the entity in this
way in order to reduce resulting net income by a deduction to
which the owner, qua individual, is not entitled.
In § 67, Congress in the 1986 Act prevented this kind of
income shifting to pass-through entities that it determined
were subject to such abuse, and it explicitly excluded trusts,
estates, and certain other entities. Congress did so even
though some of the excluded entities may, like pass-through
entities, at times distribute net income to beneficiaries who
must report it on their own income tax returns. As adopted
in the 1986 Act, § 67(c) provided:
The Secretary shall prescribe regulations which prohibit the indirect deduction through pass-thru entities
of amounts which are not allowable as a deduction if
paid or incurred directly by an individual and which
contain such reporting requirements as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this subsection. The
preceding sentence shall not apply with respect to estates, trusts, cooperatives, and real estate investment
trusts.
100 Star. at 2114, Pet. Br. App. 6a (emphasis added).26
z6 See also 26 CFR 1.67-2T(g) (defining "pass-thru entity"). We note
that the variant of trusts known as "grantor trusts" described supra at n. 1
are treated as pass-through entities as permitted by a 1988 technical
amendment to §67(c). See/d; see also 26 U.S.C. § 67(c).

30
This provision confirms that § 67(e) should be read as
preserving the full deductibility of most trust and estate costs
incurred in connection with their administration, not as preventing the deduction of what is perhaps the largest single
such cost trusts and estates incur.27
And indeed, in other provisions of the Code beyond §
67(e) Congress consistently has permitted expenses incurred
in connection with the administration of trusts and estates,
including trust investment advice fees, to be deducted from
trust and estate income even when similar expenses can not
be deducted by individuals. As described above, for example, prior to the enactment of the 1986 Act, § 57(b)(2) allowed deduction of costs incurred in connection with the
administration of a trust or estate even when similar costs
could not be deducted by individuals. See supra at 12. Even
more dramatically, § 68 provides that once an individual’s
adjusted gross income exceeds a certain threshold amount,
currently $156,400, most of his or her itemized deductions
will be reduced by the lesser of eighty percent of their total
27 The structure of § 67(e) confirms that it was not designed to address
the risk of abuse through income-shifting. Where Congress did address
abuse-prone entities it did so not by imposing a deductibility floor at the
entity level, but by requiring the individuals who ultimately received the
income to treat their share of the entity’s miscellaneous itemized deductions as subject to the two-percent floor on their own individual returns.
See 26 U.S.C. § 67(c)(1) (addressing pass-through entities). This makes
perfect sense. For to impose the two-percent floor on expenses at the
entity level, as the Commissioner would here, could actually result in a
disadvantage for those taxpayers who receive income from trusts and
estates. This could happen when an individual’s aggregate miscellaneous
itemized deductions have already met the two-percent floor - so that if
the trust investment advice expenses were passed out to the individual
separately, he or she could fully deduct them, as the individual would if
they were his or her own investment advice expenses. On the Commissioner’s reading, if the trust had not met its two-percent floor, these costs
could not be deducted at the entity level by the trust, nor could they be
deducted by the individual receiving the trust income, since that individual would not be entitled to claim the trust’s miscellaneous itemized deductions as his or her own.
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or three percent of the amount by which the adjusted gross
income exceeds that threshold. 26 U.S.C. § 68; see also Rev.
Proc. 2006-53, 2006-48 I.R.B. 996, as modified by Rev.
Proc. 2007-36, 2007-22 I.R.B. 1335 (adjusting threshold
amount for inflation). This is a parallel provision to § 67,
and it, like § 67, reduces the extent to which individuals are
able to deduct certain of the itemized deductions. See 26
U.S.C. § 68(a), (c). Yet 26 U.S.C. § 68(e) provides that
"[t]his section shall not apply to any estate or trust."
In light of all this, it cannot sensibly be maintained that
Congress intended in § 67(e) to eliminate the full deductibility of trust and estate investment management fees because
of concern about abuse hypothesized if trusts and estates
were allowed to deduct such fees from their income. The
text and structure of the statute thus indicate that § 67(e)
should be read to preserve the deductibility in full of trust
investment advice fees, not to prevent it.
II. IF THERE WERE AMBIGUITY IN § 67(e), THE
TOOLS APPROPRIATELY USED TO RESOLVE IT
WOULD ALL SUPPORT PETITIONER’S READING
The statute has a "plain meaning," despite the confusion
about its construction among the courts of appeals. And, indeed, as we will demonstrate below, none of the other proposed constructions of the statute are even textually supportable. See infra at 44-48. There is thus ultimately no ambiguity in the statute requiring inquiry beyond its text and
structure. If this Court were nonetheless to find the statute
ambiguous, the tools appropriately used to resolve statutory
ambiguity, both the legislative history and the canons of construction, support the construction of the language we have
put forward.
A. Legislative History.
Most significantly, the legislative history of § 67 confirms that Congress did not intend the two-percent floor to
apply as the Commissioner urges. It makes clear that the
primary purpose of the second prong of § 67(e) was to pre-
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vent the deduction of administrative expenses incurred by
pass-through entities in which trusts or estates happened to
have an interest. See H.R. Conf. Rep. 99-841, pt. 2, p. 34
(1986), reprinted at 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4122. These
and similar costs that have nothing to do with the fiduciary’s
unique obligations are the only ones subjected to. a twopercent floor by the statute.
1. In both the original House and Senate versions of the
bill, what became § 67(e) did not contain a second prong. In
both versions, it read simply "the adjusted gross income of
an estate or trust shall be computed in the same manner as in
the case of an individual, except that the deductions for costs
paid or incurred in connection with the administration of the
estate or trust shall be treated as allowable in arriving at adjusted gross income." See H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 132 (as passed by the House, Dec. 17, 1985); H.R. 3838,
99th Cong., 2d Sess., § 133 (as passed by the Senate, June
24, 1986), reprinted at 132 Cong. Rec. 16,061, 16,070 (June
26, 1986). Congress thus clearly intended as an initial matter
to continue its policy of allowing trusts and estates this deduction in full "above-the-line" for the costs incurred in connection with their administration.
2. Further, the legislative history of § 67(a) indicates
what has already been discussed: the two-percent floor was
adopted out of a concern that taxpayers were frequently deducting expenses with some "personal" aspect, erroneously
claiming deductions or deducting expenses that would have
been incurred even if they did not contribute to the taxpayer’s income-producing activities. See S. Rep. 99-313, at
78-79 (1986). The two-percent floor was intended to address
both such deductions and the burden upon the IRS and the
taxpayer imposed by recordkeeping requirements for determining and verifying that certain miscellaneous itemized deductions were properly claimed. See H.R. Rep. 99-426, at
109-110 (1985); S. Rep. 99-313, at 78-79. As described
above, the two-percent floor on deductions served as "rough
justice" for disallowing that part of miscellaneous itemized
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deductions assumed to be "personal."
Permitting the deduction in full of most administrative
expenses incurred by trusts by reason of the trust’s existence
was an implicit recognition that these expenses do not contain a personal aspect. It also reflected the policy determination that ordinary trust operations do not present the potential
for abuse that was addressed by the two-percent floor, a policy determination prominent in the statute as it was adopted.
See 26 U.S.C. § 67(c) (1986), Pet. Br. App. 6a.
3. The second prong of § 67(e) - the limitation on the
deduction allowed by the provision - was added only in the
Conference Committee. The history of its adoption makes
clear that it was intended primarily to address the problem of
trust and estate treatment of administrative costs passed
through to the trusts or estates by pass-through entities in
which they happened to have an ownership interest.
As described above, the 1986 Act included a provision to
restrict the ability of individuals indirectly to deduct costs of
pass-through entities in which they had an ownership interest
when those costs would not have been deductible in full had
the individuals incurred them themselves. 26 U.S.C. § 67(c).
One of the effects of the second prong of § 67(e), indeed, the
one about which the enacting Congress was specifically concerned, was to impose a parallel restriction on pass-through
entity expenses when those entities happened to be owned by
trusts and estates. If a trust is a partner or shareholder in a
pass-through entity, that entity can incur expenses in its administration, and pass them through to the trust, reporting
them on the schedule sent to the trust. The trust can then record those costs as administrative expenses on its own tax
return. Section 67(e) ensures that, when a trust owns an interest in a pass-through entity, these costs are subject to the
two-percent floor.
The Conference Committee action with respect to § 67
was focused on pass-through entities. Neither the version of
the Act passed by the House nor that reported out of the Sen-
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ate Finance Committee included any language limiting the
use of pass-through entities to avoid limitations on individual
deductions, though both exempted all costs incurred in connection with the administration of trusts and estates from the
limits on deductibility imposed on individuals. On the very
day the Senate passed its version of the Act, it first passed a
floor amendment introduced by Sen. Packwood that read
The Secretary shall prescribe regulations which prohibit the indirect deduction through pass-thru entities
of amounts which are not allowable as a deduction if
paid or incurred directly by an individual.
132 Cong. Rec. 15,156 (June 24, 1986). This was the first
time pass-through entity costs were addressed in the context
of limiting individual use of itemized deductions.
The Conference Committee adopted this language from
the final Senate bill, but it had to harmonize it with, among
other things, the provision allowing deductions for trust and
estate costs incurred in connection with their administration.
It did so first by adding to the pass-through restriction that
became § 67(c) the language expressly exempting trusts and
estates from being themselves treated as pass-through entities: "The preceding sentence shall not apply with respect to
estates, trusts, cooperatives, and real estate investment
trusts." 100 Star. at 2114, Pet. Br. App. 6a. This preserved
the benefit of the special rule allowing trusts and estates to
deduct costs incurred in connection with their administration.
Second, though, the Senate pass-through provision adopted
by the Conference Committee also applied only to "individual[s]" deducting the costs of pass-through entities. See supra this page. So, to ensure that the pass-through entity’s
costs were no more deductible when passed through to trusts
and estates than they were when passed through to individuals, the Committee added the second prong to § 67(e) providing that a trust or estate could not deduct costs incurred in
connection with administration if the cost would "have been
incurred if the property were not held in such trust or estate."
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And indeed, the legislative history of the second prong of
§ 67(e), which lies solely in the Conference Report, makes
clear that this was Congress’s purpose:
Pursuant to Treasury regulations, the [two-percent]
floor is to apply with respect to indirect deductions
through pass-through entities .... In the case of an estate or trust, the conference agreement provides that
the adjusted gross income is to be computed in the
same manner as in the case of an individual, except
that the deductions for costs that are paid and incurred
in connection with the administration of the estate or
trust and that would not have been incurred if the
property were not held in such trust or estate are
treated as allowable in arriving at adjusted gross income and hence are not subject to the floor. The regulations to be prescribed by the Treasury relating to application of the floor with respect to indirect deductions through certain pass-through entities are to include such reporting requirements as may be necessary to effectuate this provision.
H.R. Conf. Rep. 99-841, pt. 2, p. 34 (1986), reprinted at
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4122 (emphasis added).
This language - the only congressional explanation ever
given for the second prong of § 67(e), and the most authoritative legislative history there could be28 - makes clear that
the second prong was designed to prevent trusts from deducting in full the administrative expenses incurred by passthrough entities in which they held an ownership interest that
would have been incurred whether or not the pass-through
interest was held in the trust. Section 67(e) means that when
a trust owns an interest in a pass-through entity, such costs of
28 See, e.g., Railway Labor Executives Ass’n v. 1CC, 735 F.2d 691, 701
(CA2 1984) (Friendly, J.) (citation omitted) ("Because the conference
report represents the final statement of terms agreed to by both houses,
next to the statute itself it is the most persuasive evidence of congressional intent.").
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pass-through entities they own are subject to the two-percent
floor. That is why, as the legislative history explains, its effectuation required the Secretary to take account of § 67(e)
in reporting requirements relating to application of the floor
to expenses of pass-through entities. The reporting requirements issued by the Treasury to implement the statutory
command that pass-through entity costs were to be subjected
to the two percent floor by their owners who were individuals would have to be crafted to address the rule enacted in §
67(e) under which pass-through entity costs would also be
subjected to the two-percent floor limitation when the passthrough entity was owned by a trust or estate.
The legislative history thus confirms our reading of the
statute. Section 67(e) was enacted to impose the two-percent
floor on costs incurred in connection with the administration
of trusts and estates that were not caused by the property being held in the trust or estate, but that would have been incurred regardless of the property’s ownership, archetypally
the administrative costs of pass-through entities. There is no
indication at all in the legislative history that the Conference
Committee intended instead to depart from the position already taken by both Houses of Congress in the versions of
the bill they had passed: That the pre-existing tax treatment
of trusts and estates would be continued by permitting an
above-the-line deduction for most costs incurred in connection with trust and estate administration. The legislative history makes clear that Congress simply did not intend the significant change in the taxation of trusts and estates that
would have been wrought by a restriction on the deduction
of what is perhaps the largest single such expense, fees for
trust and estate investment advice.
4. By contrast, the legislative history long relied upon by
the Commissioner is irrelevant to the provision before the
Court. The Commissioner says
Congress... sought to reduce the tax benefit of placing assets in trust in order to split income between the
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trust and its beneficiaries, primarily by setting the tax
rates for trusts so that little income could be sheltered
at the lower rates. See 26 U.S.C. l(e); S. Rep. No.
313, supra, at 867-868. Making the 2% floor for miscellaneous itemized deductions applicable to trusts
(with an exception for trust-related administrative expenses that would not have been incurred if the property were not held in a trust) also serves that goal by
preventing trusts from fully deducting the same expenses that individuals cannot fully deduct.
Opp. at 12.
No one would deny that Congress set the tax rates for
trusts in 26 U.S.C. § l(e) in such a way as to discourage
splitting income. Under that provision trusts and estates
currently reach the top 35% tax bracket with undistributed
taxable income of more than $10,050, while individuals need
to have more than $349,700 of taxable income to be taxed at
the highest rate. See 26 U.S.C. § l(a)-(e); Rev. Proc. 200653 § 3.01, 2006-48 I.R.B. 996, as modified by Rev. Proc.
2007-36, 2007-22 I.R.B. 1335. But that (and the inapposite
Senate Report describing it cited by the Commissioner) has
nothing to do with the two-percent floor, or the meaning of
the second prong of § 67(e). Indeed, the Senate Report the
Commissioner cites states that the Committee "believe[d]
that significant changes in the taxation of trusts or estates"
beyond the new rate schedule were "unnecessary" to address
"the tax benefits which result from the ability to split income
between a trust or estate and its beneficiaries." S. Rep. 99313 at 868 (1986). Section 67(e) is designed precisely to
allow some miscellaneous itemized deductions to be deductible in full by trusts and estates, even though for an individual all such deductions are subject to the two-percent
floor. The only question of legislative purpose actually implicated here is why the Congress added the second clause to
§ 67(e). And that is answered by the legislative history described above.
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B. Canons of Construction
Canons of statutory construction applicable to the interpretation of ambiguous statutes also favor the position taken
by Petitioner.
This is a tax statute. There is of course a longstanding
and "traditional canon that construes revenue-raising laws
against their drafter." United Dominion Indus. v. United
States, 532 U.S. 822, 839 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring).
As this Court has explained, in construing a revenue statute,
"[i]f the words are doubtful, the doubt must be resolved
against the Government and in favor of the taxpayer."
United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 188 (1923).
The Commissioner has argued, citing INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992), that "[b]ecause deductions are matters of legislative grace, they are strictly
construed, and any vagueness in a Code section authorizing a
deduction must be resolved in favor of the Government."
Gov’t CA2 Br. 18.
Even if that were a viable, broadly applicable rule of construction it would not apply here. There is no question that
the fees at issue here qualify as "miscellaneous itemized deductions." The only question is whether they are allowable
in full or subject to the two-percent floor. Further, the dispute is over the applicability vel non of an exclusion from a
rule of full deductibility. Thus, this case does not involve a
determination of the scope of a deduction in light of a background rule that the income in question is to be taxed. It involves the determination of the scope of an exception in light
of a background rule that costs of this type are fully deductible.
In any event, as this discussion may suggest, the rule described in INDOPCO is not a viable, broadly applicable
canon of construction. In INDOPCO, the Court applied the
canon of resolving doubt against deductibility only in the
context of determining whether a particular expense was deductible or was instead a capital expenditure to be amortized
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and depreciated, and it did so only after examining the statute to find a "norm of capitalization." 503 U.S. at 84. The
Court acknowledged that it was "[i]n exploring the relationship between deductions and capital expenditures" that it
had "noted the ’familiar rule’ that ’an income tax deduction
is a matter of legislative grace and that the burden of clearly
showing the right to the claimed deduction is on the taxpayer.’" Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Court said that in
that one context "deductions are strictly construed and allowed only ’as there is a clear provision therefor.’" Id. (citing New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440
(1934); Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488,493 (1940)).
By contrast, the cases 1NDOPCO quoted and cited are all
over sixty years old. Outside of this narrow context, this
Court appears not to have relied upon the canon based upon
deductions being a matter of "legislative grace" since Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 560
(1944). Before INDOPCO it was last cited by this Court
over thirty years ago. See Commissioner v. National Alfalfa
Dehydrating and Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 148 (1974).
Indeed, this Court has viewed this alleged rule of construction of deductions with skepticism since at least 1952, when
it pointedly declined to rely upon it in Lykes v. United States,
343 U.S. 118, 120 n.4 (1952) (citing Griswold, An Argument
against the Doctrine that Deductions Should be Narrowly
Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 Harv. L.
Rev. 1142 (1943)).
Of course, as Justice Thomas’s concurrence in United
Dominion Industries suggests, the idea that deductions must
be construed against the taxpayer is at most a vestige of another era, when it was thought that not taxing someone’s income was an act of "legislative grace." Whether done
through narrow interpretations of deductions or through
broad interpretations of a tax, the employment of an ambiguous statute to impose tax upon an individual is an assertion
of power by the State to make a claim upon some of his or
her income without a clear expression of congressional in-
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tent. The canon that revenue laws must be construed against
the government has equal force in both circumstances. See
522 U.S. at 839 (Thomas, J., concurring). The canons of
construction applicable in cases of statutory ambiguity thus
favor Petitioner’s reading of the statute.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUCTION WOULD
WORK SUBSTANTIAL DETRIMENT TO BENEFICIARIES AND THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY.
Any construction of the statute that forbids full deduction
for trust investment fees would have serious consequences
that Congress could not have intended for beneficiaries and
the financial services industry.
Of course, the imposition of this tax would consistently
erode trust corpus, and thus the earnings thereon, not just
once, but in cumulative fashion, year after year. That would
be a direct harm to the beneficiaries that trusts and estates
exist to protect. Further, though, if fees for investment advice were no longer fully deductible, trustees would have an
incentive to attempt to fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities
of prudent investment without incurring investment management and advice fees subject to the two-percent floor.
This would be harmful both to beneficiaries and to the financial services industry.
Some, particularly smaller trusts, may take their assets
out of management and attempt to invest them in mutual
funds, the costs of which are always deductible under 26
U.S.C. § 67(c)(2). Indeed, commentators have urged this
approach since the decision below was handed down. See
Cohen, A Tense Time for Trust Administration, 146 Trusts
and Estates 28, 29 (2007). Others may try to use brokers,
who typically charge only commissions for purchases and
sales. These commissions are included in the cost basis for
securities and deducted from the gain upon sale so that they
are, effectively, excluded from taxable income. See 26 CFR
1.263(a)-2(e). Many will also likely seek trustees who are
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themselves skilled in investment, so that no separate investment advice and management fee need be incurred, but the
fee will be built into deductible "trustee fees." This is an approach that has been described repeatedly in the literature,z9
A trustee must always fulfill his or her fiduciary obligations, but it would make little sense for Congress to have
created an incentive for one method of trust and estate investment over another. An affirmance of the decision below
would be harmful both to the beneficiaries for whom the
trusts were created in the first place, and to the financial services industry whose professionals may be best able to assist
with fulfillment of fiduciary obligations and to ensure that
trusts and estates are managed appropriately in light of their
purposes. Cf BriefAmici Curiae of the American Bankers
Association, et aL, in Support of Petition for Certiorari 6.
IV. ONLY PETITIONER’S CONSTRUCTION OFFERS
A COHERENT APPROACH TO THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE’S LONGSTANDING TREATMENT OF COSTS INCURRED IN CONNECTION
WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF TRUSTS AND
ESTATES.
Only the principle of full allowability for costs caused by
the fact that the property is held in the trust or estate can
adequately explain the Commissioner’s own longstanding
position with respect to a wide range of costs incurred in
connection with the administration of trusts and estates. Indeed, the principle we advocate here is the same one that
29 See, e.g., Satchit, Estates, Trusts & Gifts: Trusts, Investment Advisory
Fees and the 2% Floor, Tax Adviser, Feb. 2004 at 87, 88; Hohos, Fees
Paid By Trustees For Investment Strategy Advice and Management Services are not Deductible Under Section 67(e)(1): Mellon Bank, N.A.v.
United States, 54 Tax Law. 693, 699 (2001). It has been the Commissioner’s longstanding position that ’~rustee fees" are deductible, see, e.g.,
Opp. at 11, even though these are fees that are paid by the trust to the
trustee himself or herself primarily for managing the trust assets. The
Commissioner’s new proposed regulation does not directly address trustee fees. See infra n.32.
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animates the Commissioner’s treatment of all such expenses
except for those at issue here, expenses for trust and estate
investment advice.
Thus, the Commissioner’s position consistently has been
that fees for income tax preparation incurred by trustees are
fully deductible, even though income tax preparation fees are
routinely incurred by individuals and are subject to the twopercent floor. See Opp. 11; Levin, Limitation on Deductions
for Trusts: Ill/hat Should a Trustee Do?, 111 Tax Notes 445,
453 (Apr. 24, 2006) ("Income tax return preparation fees...
are not unique to trusts or estates."). This position is reiterated in the Commissioner’s proposed regulation. See Pet.
Br. App. 14a. Similarly, the Commissioner has long taken
the position that legal fees and accounting fees incurred by
trusts are fully deductible, even though the same types of
fees are commonly incurred by individuals, for whom they
are subject to the two-percent floor. See id. Indeed, there is
a line on the Form 1041 for the full deduction of "attorney,
accountant and return preparer fees" under § 67(e). See J.A.
12 (line 14).
The Commissioner’s attempts to distinguish these expenses and to explain the meandering line he has drawn in
practice rest upon the inappropriately broad level of generality in his description of trust investment advisory fees. He
has thus called the fees at issue in this case "fees for investment advice," Opp. at 10; see also Gov’t CA2 Br. 11 (describing this as a cost "of a type that would customarily be
incurred outside the context of trusts").3° Costs that he has
historically allowed in full, however, he describes more narrowly. In his proposed regulation, he thus, for example, describes trust legal fees as fees for services rendered in connection with "judicial... filings required as part of the administration of the trust or estate." Pet. Br. App. 14a (em30 As described above, the Commissioner’s latest proposal is that only
fees for "advice on investing for total return," are subject to the twopercent floor. Pet. Br. App. 14a.
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phasis added), and trust income tax preparation fees as fees
for services rendered in connection with "fiduciary income
tax" returns. Id. (emphasis added).31 That more particular
approach is what the statute, in asking about specific costs,
properly requires. The correct way to describe the fees at
issue here is "investment advice fees required as part of the
administration of the trust or estate," or "trust investment
advice fees."
A rule of law must be applied in a principled manner, or
it is no rule of law at all. Cf. Scalia, The Rule of Law as a
Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1989). And this
Court has made clear that, where tax law is concerned, substance is what matters, not labels. See, e.g., Commissioner v.
Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331,334 (1945). The costs the
Commissioner allows are, indeed, fully deductible - and as
his treatment of them suggests, trust investment advice fees
are as well. The only principled explanation for construing §
67(e) to permit the Commissioner’s preferred deductions-infull is that those particular expenses are caused by the fact
that the property is held in the trust or estate. They purchase
services for the trust or estate that differ in character from
31 The Commissioner has also suggested that preparation of a fiduciary
income tax return is an "additional" cost created by the trust because an
individual would have to prepare an individual income tax return whether
or not he or she held the property that is now held in the trust. Opp. at
11. Contrary to the Commissioner’s suggestion, an individual is not required to file an income tax return simply because he or she exists. Individuals, like trusts, are required to file income tax returns - and therefore
may incur fees for their preparation - only when they have income above
a certain amount. See 26 U.S.C. § 6012(a)(3)-(4) (in general only trusts
with gross income above a certain amount or with some ’~axable income" need file fiduciary income tax returns); id. § 6012(a)(1) (only individuals with income above a certain amount need file income tax returns). If the trust, with no other assets or income, were to turn the trust
property over to a sirnilady situated individual, that individual would be
required to file an individual income tax return - and thus perhaps to
incur a fee for the preparation of such a return - only because of his or
her ownership of that income-producing property.
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similar services purchased by individuals. Those particular
costs, therefore would not have been incurred if the property
had not been held in the trust in question, though similar
costs may, and often are, incurred by individuals. The same
principle applies to Petitioner’s costs in issue here.32
V. THE OTHER PROPOSED READINGS ARE NOT
TEXTUALLY PLAUSIBLE.
The statutory language will not support any of the other
proposed readings of § 67(e).
A. The Commissioner’s New Proposed Interpretation is
Textually Unsupportable.
The Commissioner has now abandoned his longstanding
position that only expenses commonly or customarily incurred outside trusts may be deducted in full. While this
presumably reflects his recognition that the position he has
taken in the past and throughout this litigation was wrong,
the position he has now adopted and that was taken by the
court below is similarly incompatible with the statute’s text.
Section 67(e) provides that the trust’s administrative expenses are fully deductible so long as they "would not have
been incurred if the property were not held in such trust or
estate." 26 U.S.C. § 67(e) (emphasis added). The Commis32 The Commissioner has argued that "trustee fees" are deductible, even
though they primarily purchase investment management services. See,
Opp. at 11. The reason a trust’s payment of such fees should, indeed, be
fully deductible is that the cost is incurred because a trustee’s services are
needed to fulfill the fiduciary duties imposed by the trust. A trust purchases a service that individuals do not need: management of the trust in
accord with state law and the terms of the trust. The "delegat[ion of]
investment and management functions" by the fiduciary, here the Trustees, to an agent, here Warfield, cloaks the agent with the fidueiary’s
obligations as a matter of law. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-541i. Perhaps
because it is impossible to defend allowing a full deduction for trustee
fees while disallowing a full deduction for trust investment fees like
those at issue here, the Commissioner’s proposed regulation, which categorizes many examples of different costs, does not specifically mention
trustee fees at all. See Pet. Br. App. 14a-15a.
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sioner’s new proposed reading is that a cost is deductible
only "if an individual could not have incurred that cost in
connection with property not held in an estate or trust." Pet.
Br. App. 14a (emphasis added); see also Pet. App. 13a (Second Circuit concluding "that the plain meaning of the statute
permits a trust to take a full deduction only for those costs
that could not have been incurred by an individual property
owner.").
This is just wrong. "Would" simply does not mean
"could." And a conclusion that a cost "would not" have
been incurred in a particular circumstance does not mean that
it "could not" have been. This interpretation had its genesis
in the Second Circuit, which cut it from whole cloth. This is
not a reading the Commissioner urged in that court - presumably because it flatly contradicts the text of the statute.
Further, this new proposed construction would render a
portion of § 67(e) superfluous. The clause in question reads
"the deductions for costs which are paid or incurred in connection with the administration of the estate or trust and
which would not have been incurred if the property were not
held in such trust or estate..." shall be treated as allowable.
26 U.S.C. § 67(e) (emphasis added). The language italicized
in the quotation above, however, would be superfluous under
the reading now proposed by the Commissioner.
Costs that "an individual could not have incurred.., in
connection with property not held in an estate or trust"
within the definition put forward by the Commissioner include only costs "paid or incurred in connection with the
administration of the estate or trust," as required by § 67(e)’s
first prong. Thus, if the second prong meant what the Commissioner claims, the statute need not have included the first
prong at all. In construing statutes, a court of course must
"give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute." Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). "It is a cardinal
principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon
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the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no
clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant." TRWInc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Finally, the new test proposed by the Commissioner
would be utterly, even absurdly, unworkable. One can see
this in the line the proposed regulation draws requiring "unbundling" of costs for "advice on investing for total return."
Pet. Br. 14a. If a single trust investment advice fee included
some portion attributable to such advice and some portion
attributable to advice on investing for some other objective,
under the Commissioner’s reading only the former portion
would be subject to the two-percent floor. The rest would
presumably be deductible in full. The task of documenting
which expenses lie where, or of identifying the portion of
fees that are on one side of the line under the newly proposed
test and the portion that are on the other, or of auditing those
questions, would each be almost insurmountable. Section 67
was enacted to eliminate precisely such burdens, not to create new and even more dramatic ones.
B. The Statute Does Not Ask Whether Costs are of a
Type That Are "Customarily" Incurred Outside Trusts
and Estates.
The statute also cannot bear the meaning given it by the
Fourth and Federal Circuits, that costs of a type customarily
or commonly incurred outside of trusts are subject to the
two-percent floor. Indeed, the Commissioner essentially has
conceded as much in abandoning this, his longstanding interpretation of the statute, in his proposed regulation. Compare Pet. Br. App. 14a with Govt. CA2 Br. 3-4, 22-24; Govt.
Scott Br. 27, and Govt. Mellon Br. 27.
The statute does not ask whether a cost incurred in connection with the administration of a trust is of a type "customarily" or "’commonly" incurred outside of trusts. It asks
whether the cost would or "’would not have been incurred if
the property were not held in such trust or estate." 26 U.S.C.
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§ 67(e). The statute’s plain language, again, will not bear the
suggested reading.
The Courts of Appeals that adopted that test did so only
because they mistakenly thought any other test would render
the second prong of § 67(e) superfluous. See Mellon Bank,
265 F.3d at 1280-81 ("under Mellon’s construction, the second prerequisite of section 67(e)(1) would be rendered superfluous"); Scott, 328 F.3d at 140 ("to give effect to [the
second clause of §67(e)] we must hold that the investment
advice fees incurred by the trust do not qualify for the exception...").
These courts, however, were wrong about this feared superfluity. As described above costs incurred in connection
with the administration of the trust or estate that are attendant upon ownership of property and that would be incurred
by any owner are subject to the two-percent floor. This includes costs like the costs of maintaining real property that
happens to be owned by the trust or estate. It also includes
administrative costs that have been passed through to the
trust from so-called "pass-through entities" in which the trust
has an ownership interest.
In the absence of a superfluity problem, there is literally
nothing in the language of the statute to commend, or in fact
permit, the Fourth and Federal Circuit’s reading. And indeed, this proposed interpretation seems to derive solely
from a mistaken use of one of the dictionary definitions of
the word "would." The Commissioner began arguing long
ago that "if a trust-related administrative expense is also customarily or habitually incurred outside of trusts, then it is
subject to the two-percent floor." Govt. Mellon Br. 27; see
Govt. CA2 Br. 22. That assertion has been based solely on
the premise that "the verb ’would’.... expresses such concepts as custom, habit, natural disposition or probability."
Gov’t Mellon Br. at 27 (citing two dictionaries); Govt. CA2
Br. at 22 (same).
But that is obviously not the sense in which the word
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"would" is used here. See, e.g., Merriam-Webster Collegiate
Dictionary 1445 (1 lth ed. 2003) (giving as an example of the
use of the word "would" to "express custom or habitual action" the phrase "we would meet often for lunch"); Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language
2955 (2d ed. 1958) (describing the use of "would" to describe custom or habit as a "special use"); see also Commissioner v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168, 174 (2004) (citation omitted) (stating that "[i]n interpreting the meaning of the words
in a revenue Act, we look to the ’"ordinary, everyday
senses"’ of the words," and relying upon a dictionary definition to confirm the statute’s meaning). The statute is not
asking about what happened in the past customarily or habitually. It is asking concretely with respect to the particular
trust or estate whether the cost at issue is one "which would
not have been incurred if the property were not held in such
trust or estate."
Finally, the test previously urged by the Commissioner
and adopted by the Fourth and Federal Circuits would also
be unmanageable, and Congress cannot have intended that.
If determining whether a cost "would not have been incurred
if the property were not held in such trust or estate" requires
examining what individuals "commonly" or "customarily"
do in like circumstances, the statute could require a trial in
virtually every case to determine what individuals customarily do in various particular factual situations. Nor is it at all
clear upon what evidence a court could rely in answering the
question what costs individuals "customarily" incur in the
myriad variable fact patterns that will be presented by different trusts. It is perhaps for this reason that the Commissioner
has now abandoned this construction of the statute.33
33 Because the Commissioner’s proposed regulation is just that, a proposed regulation, it would of course even in the face of statutory ambiguity not be entitled to deference of any kind. Notice and comment on tax
regulations typically stretches into a several-year process. See, e.g., 26
CFR 1.643(b)-I (notice of proposed rulemaking issued February 15,
2001, final regulation published January 2, 2004). Sometimes it can take

49
VI. EVEN UNDER THE OTHER PROPOSED READINGS OF THE STATUTE, THE TRUST INVESTMENT
FEES HERE WOULD BE FULLY DEDUCTIBLE.
Finally, even if this Court were to adopt the Fourth and
Federal Circuit’s reading of the statute, or that adopted by
the Second Circuit and contained in the Commissioner’s
proposed regulation, the judgment below would have to be
reversed because the fees at issue here would nonetheless be
fully deductible.
First, it is not "common" or "customary" for individuals
to place their assets under management and to incur percentage-of-assets annual investment advice fees similar to the
ones imposed upon the Rudkin Trust here.34 Indeed, the
Commissioner has never produced any evidence suggesting
that it is. To the extent individuals have liquid assets and the
discipline or propensity to invest (even beyond the most
as long as fifteen years. See, e.g., 26 CFR 1.401(a)(9)-1 (notice of proposed rulemaking issued July 27, 1987, final and temporary regulations
published April 17, 2002). Adoption of the proposed regulation will
likely face enormous opposition from the most important relevant elements of the bar, the financial services industry, and the public. See, e.g.,
Reply Brief on Petition for Certiorari App. 10a (recommendation of the
American Bar Association Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust
Law); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Tax Section of the Florida Bar; Brief
Amicus Curiae of American Bankers Association, et al.
Final regulations issued under the authority of 26 U.S.C. § 7805 that
are reasonable are entitled not to Chevron, but to the weaker National
Muffler standard of deference. Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S.
437, 448 (2003) (citations omitted); see Salem, et al., ABA Section of
Taxation Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 Tax Law.
717, 761-763 (2004) (Court adheres to National Muffler rather than
Chevron in cases involving interpretive tax regulations). An agency construction like the one contained in the proposed regulation that is contrary
to the text of the statute by definition would not be a "reasonable" one.
Whatever ambiguity § 67 might be said to have, it is clear the word
"would" in § 67(e) does not mean "could."
34 Petitioner argued below that management fees were not commonly or
customarily incurred by individuals, an argument the court of appeals did
not reach because of its adoption of the incorrect standard. Pet. 27.
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common investment, real estate), they appear most frequently to invest in mutual funds; others invest in certificates
of deposit; some also invest in individual stocks, ordinarily
with the assistance of a broker. The costs associated with
these transactions are not subject to the two-percent floor.
See supra at 40. Exceedingly few individuals put their assets
under management. Incurring fees for investment advice
from a money manager is unusual; it certainly is not "common," nor, afortiori, is it "customary."
Nor would these fees be subject to the two-percent floor
under the test articulated by the Commissioner in his proposed regulation and described by the Second Circuit. Trust
investment advice fees like those incurred here, compelled
by the need for investment of funds consistent with fiduciary
obligations, are peculiar to trusts and estates. It is not only
the case that they would not have been incurred had the
property here not been held in the Rudkin trust. Such fees
cannot be incurred by an individual. See supra at 5-10. And
indeed, in limiting the description in his proposed regulation
of investment advice fees subject to the two-percent floor to
those for "advice on investing for total return," the Commissioner concedes that under his own proposal only fees for
investment advice that is the same as that geared to individual investors is subject to that floor. Since the fees in this
case were not for advice so geared, they would be fully deductible even under the principle he has articulated.35
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Second Circuit should be reversed.

35 Were this Court to adopt one of these standards, therefore, at the very
least a remand would be required to permit its proper application by the
court of appeals.
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APPENDIX A
26 U.S.C. § 67 (2007)
§ 67. 2-percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions
(a) General rule
In the case of an individual, the miscellaneous itemized
deductions for any taxable year shall be allowed only to the
extent that the aggregate of such deductions exceeds 2
percent of adjusted gross income.
Co) Miscellaneous itemized deductions
For purposes of this section, the term "miscellaneous
itemized deductions" means the itemized deductions other
than(l) the deduction under section 163 (relating to interest),
(2) the deduction under section 164 (relating to taxes),
(3) the deduction under section 165(a) for casualty or
theft losses described in paragraph (2) or (3) of section
165(c) or for losses described in section 165(d),
(4) the deductions under section 170 (relating to
charitable, etc., contributions and gifts) and section 642(c)
(relating to deduction for amounts paid or permanently set
aside for a charitable purpose),
(5) the deduction under section 213 (relating to medical,
dental, etc., expenses),
(6) any deduction allowable for impairment-related work
expenses,
(7) the deduction under section 691(c) (relating to
deduction for estate tax in case of income in respect of the
decedent),
(8) any deduction allowable in connection with personal
property used in a short sale,
(9) the deduction under section 1341 (relating to
computation of tax where taxpayer restores substantial
amount held under claim of right),
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(10) the deduction under section 72(b)(3) (relating to
deduction where annuity payments cease before investment
recovered),
(11) the deduction under section 171 (relating to
deduction for amortizable bond premium), and.
(12) the deduction under section 216 (relating to
deductions in connection with cooperative housing
corporations).
(c) Disallowance of indirect deduction through pass-thru
entity
(1) In general
The Secretary shall prescribe regulations which prohibit
the indirect deduction through pass-thru entities of amounts
which are not allowable as a deduction if paid or incurred
directly by an individual and which contain such reporting
requirements as may be necessary to carry out the purposes
of this subsection.
(2) Treatment of publicly offered regulated investment
companies
(A) In general
Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to any
publicly offered regulated investment company.
(B) Publicly offered regulated investment companies
For purposes of this subsection(i) In general
The term "publicly offered regulated investment
company" means a regulated investment company the
shares of which are(I) continuously offered pursuant to a public
offering (within the meaning of section 4 of the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended (15 U.S.C. 77a to
77aa)),
(II) regularly traded on an established securities
market, or
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(III) held by or for no fewer than 500 persons at all
times during the taxable year.
(ii) Secretary may reduce 5011 person requirement
The Secretary may by regulation decrease the
minimum shareholder requirement of clause (i)(III) in
the case of regulated investment companies which
experience a loss of shareholders through net
redemptions of their shares.
(3) Treatment of certain other entities
Paragraph (1) shall not apply(A) with respect to cooperatives and real estate
investment trusts, and
(B) except as provided in regulations, with respect to
estates and trusts.
(d) Impairment-related work expenses
For purposes of this section, the term "impairment-related
work expenses" means expenses(l) of a handicapped individual (as defined in section
190(b)(3)) for attendant care services at the individual’s
place of employment and other expenses in connection with
such place of employment which are necessary for such
individual to be able to work, and
(2) with respect to which a deduction is allowable under
section 162 (determined without regard to this section).
(e) Determination of adjusted gross income in case of
estates and trusts
For purposes of this section, the adjusted gross income of
an estate or trust shall be computed in the same manner as in
the case of an individual, except that(l) the deductions for costs which are paid or incurred in
connection with the administration of the estate or trust and
which would not have been incurred if the property were
not held in such trust or estate, and
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(2) the deductions allowable under sections 642(b), 651,
and 661,
shall be treated as allowable in arriving at adjusted gross
income. Under regulations, appropriate adjustments shall be
made in the application of part I of subchapter J of this
chapter to take into account the provisions of this section.
(f) Coordination with other limitation
This section shall be applied before the application of the
dollar limitation 6f the second sentence of section 162(a)
(relating to trade or business expenses).
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APPENDIX B
26 U.S.C. § 67 (1986) as adopted in Pub. L. No. 99-514,
§ 132(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2113 (1986)
SEC. 67. 2-PERCENT .FLOOR ON MISCELLANEOUS
ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS.
(a) GENERAI. RULE.--In the case of an individual, the
miscellaneous itemized deductions for any taxable year shall
be allowed only to the extent that the aggregate of such
deductions exceeds 2 percent of adjusted gross income.
(b) MISCELLANEOUS ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS.--For

purposes of this section, the term ’miscellaneous itemized
deductions’ means the itemized deductions other than(l) the deduction under section 163 (relating to
interest),
(2) the deduction under section 164 (relating to taxes),
(3) the deduction under section 165(a) for losses
described in subsection (c)(3) or (d) of section 165,
(4) the deduction under section 170 (relating to
charitable, etc., contributions and gifts),
(5) the deduction under section 213 (relating to
medical, dental, etc., expenses),
(6) the deduction under section 217 (relating to
moving expenses),
(7) any deduction allowable for impairment-related
work expenses,
(8) the deduction under section 691(c) (relating to
deduction for estate tax in case of income in respect of
the decedent),
(9) any deduction allowable in connection with
personal property used in a short sale,
(10) the deduction under section 1341 (relating to
computation of tax where taxpayer restores substantial
amount held under claim of right),
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(11) the deduction under section 72(b)(3) (relating to
deduction where annuity payments cease before
investment recovered),
(12) the deduction under section 171 (relating to
deduction for amortizable bond premium), and
(13) the deduction under section 216 (relating to
deductions in connection with cooperative housing
corporations).
(c) DISALLOWANCE OF INDIRECT DEDUCTION THROUGH

PASS-THRU ENTITY.--The Secretary shall prescribe
regulations which prohibit the indirect deduction through
pass-thru entities of amounts which are not allowable as a
deduction if paid or incurred directly by an individual and
which contain such reporting requirements as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this subsection. The
preceding sentence shall not apply with respect to estates,
trusts, cooperatives, and real estate investment trusts.
(d) IMPAIRMENT-RELATED WORK EXPENSES.--For
purposes of this section, the term ’impairment-related work
expenses’ means expenses(l) of a handicapped individual (as defined in section
190(b)(3)) for attendant care services at the individual’s
place of employment and other expenses in connection
with such place of employment which are necessary for
such individual to be able to work, and
(2) with respect to which a deduction is allowable
under section 162 (determined without regard to this
section).
(e) DETERMINATION OF ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME IN
CASE OF ESTATES AND TRUSTS.--For purposes of this

section, the adjusted gross income of an estate or trust shall
be computed in the same manner as in the case of an
individual, except that the deductions for costs which are
paid or incurred in connection with the administration of the
estate or trust and would not have been incurred if the
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property were not held in such trust or estate shall be treated
as allowable in arriving at adjusted gross income.
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APPENDIX C
72 Fed. Reg. 41,423 (July 27, 2007) (Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and Notice of Public Hearing)
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Internal Revenue Service
26 CFR Part 1
[REG-128224-06]
RIN 1545-BF80
Section 67 Limitations on Estates or Trusts
AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking and notice of
public hearing.
SUMMARY: This document contains proposed regulations
that provide guidance on which costs incurred by estates or
non-grantor trusts are subject to the 2-percent floor for
miscellaneous itemized deductions under section 67(a). The
regulations will affect estates and non-grantor trusts. This
document also provides notice of a public hearing on these
proposed regulations.
DATES: Written and electronic comments must be received
by October 25, 2007. Outlines of topics to be discussed at
the public hearing scheduled for November 14, 2007 must be
received by October 24, 2007.
ADDRESSES: Send submissions to CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG128224-06), room 5203, Internal Revenue Service, P.O. Box
7604, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC 20044.
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Submissions may be hand-delivered Monday through Friday
between the hours of 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. to CC:PA:LPD:PR
(REG-128224-06), Courier’s Desk, Internal Revenue Service,
1111 Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC, or sent
electronically via the Federal eRulemaking Portal at http:#
www.regulations.gov/ (indicate IRS and REG-128224-06).
The public hearing will be held in the IRS Auditorium,
Internal Revenue Building, 1111 Constitution Avenue, NW.,
Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Concerning the proposed regulations, Jennifer N. Keeney,
(202) 622-3060; concerning submissions of comments, the
hearing, or to be placed on the building access list to attend
the hearing, Richard A. Hurst, (202) 622-7180 (not toll-free
numbers).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
This document contains proposed amendments to 26 CFR
part 1. Section 67(a) of the Intemal Revenue Code (Code)
provides that, for an individual taxpayer, miscellaneous
itemized deductions are allowed only to the extent that the
aggregate of those deductions exceeds 2 percent of adjusted
gross income. Section 67(b) excludes certain itemized
deductions from the definition of "miscellaneous itemized
deductions." Section 67(e) provides that, for purposes of
section 67, the adjusted gross income of an estate or trust
shall be computed in the same manner as in the case of an
individual. However, section 67(e)(1) provides that the
deductions for costs paid or incurred in connection with the
administration of the estate or trust and which would not
have been incurred if the property were not held in such
estate or trust shall be treated as allowable in arriving at
adjusted gross income. Therefore, deductions described in
section 67(e)(1) are not subject to the 2-percent floor for
miscellaneous itemized deductions under section 67(a).
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United States courts of appeals have interpreted the
language of section 67(e)(1) differently in determining
whether costs incurred by trustees are subject to the 2-percent
floor. The issue in each case has been whether the trust’s
costs (specifically, investment advisory fees) "would not
have been incurred if the property were not held in such trust
or estate." In O’Neill v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 302 (6th
Cir. 1993), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that investment advisory fees paid for professional
investment services were fully deductible under section
67(e)(1) where the trustees lacked experience in managing
large sums of money. The court found that, under state law,
the trustee was required to engage an investment advisor to
meet its fiduciary obligations and to incur fees that the trust
would not have incurred if the property were not held in trust.
The court held that estate or trust expenditures that are
necessary to meet specific fiduciary obligations under state
law are not subject to the 2-percent floor. In contrast, in
Mellon Bank, N.A. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1275 (Fed.
Cir. 2001), Scott v. United States, 328 F.3d 132 (4th Cir.
2003), and Rudkin v. Commissioner, 467 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.
2006), the courts held that investment advisory fees are
subject to the 2-percent floor. These courts read the language
of section 67(e)(1) differently than the Sixth Circuit.
Specifically, the courts in Scott and Mellon Bank concluded
that a trust expense is subject to the 2-percent floor if it is an
expense "commonly" or "customarily" incurred by
individuals; and the court in Rudkin looked to whether such
an expense was "peculiar to trusts" and "could not" be
incurred by an individual.
The result of this lack of consistency in the case law is
that the deductions of similarly situated taxpayers may or
may not be subject to the 2-percent floor, depending upon the
jurisdiction in which the executor or the trustee is located.
The IRS and the Treasury Department believe that similarly
situated taxpayers should be treated consistently by having
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section 67(e)(1) construed and applied in the same way in all
jurisdictions. The proposed regulations are intended to
provide a uniform standard for identifying the types of costs
that are not subject to the 2-percent floor under section
67(e)(1).
Explanation of Provisions
These proposed regulations provide that costs incurred by
estates or non-grantor trusts that are unique to an estate or
trust are not subject to the 2-percent floor. For this purpose,
a cost is unique to an estate or trust if an individual could not
have incurred that cost in connection with property not held
in an estate or trust. To the extent that expenses paid or
incurred by an estate or non-grantor trust do not meet this
standard, they are subject to the 2-percent floor of section
67(a). (Neither section 67 nor this rule applies to expenses
that are excluded under section 67(b) from the definition of
miscellaneous itemized deductions, or to expenses related to
a trade or business.)
Under the proposed regulations, whether costs are subject
to the 2- percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions
depends on the type of services provided, rather than on
taxpayer characterizations or labels for such services. Thus,
taxpayers may not circumvent the 2-percent floor by
"bundling" investment advisory fees and trustees’ fees into a
single fee. The regulations provide that, if an estate or nongrantor trust pays a single fee that includes both costs that are
unique to estates and trusts and costs that are not, then the
estate or non-grantor trust must use a reasonable method to
allocate the single fee between the two types of costs. The
regulations also provide a non-exclusive list of services for
which the cost is either exempt from or subject to the 2percent floor. The IRS and the Treasury Department invite
comments on whether any safe harbors or other guidance,
concerning allocation methods or otherwise, would be
helpful.
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Proposed Effective Date
The regulations, as proposed, apply to payments made
after the date final regulations are published in the Federal
Register.
Special Analyses
It has been determined that this notice of proposed
rulemaking is not a significant regulatory action as defined in
Executive Order 12866. Therefore, a regulatory assessment
is not required. It has also been determined that section
55309) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.
chapter 5) does not apply to these regulations, and because
these regulations do not impose a collection of information
on small entities, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C.
chapter 6) does not apply. Therefore, a Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis is not required. Pursuant to section
7805(f) of the Code, this notice of proposed rulemaking has
been submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the
Small Business Administration for comment on its impact on
small business.
Comments and Public Hearing
Before these proposed regulations are adopted as final
regulations, consideration will be given to any written (a
signed original and eight (8) copies) or electronic comments
that are submitted timely to the IRS. The IRS and Treasury
Department request comments on the proposed rules, as well
as their clarity and how they can be made easier to
understand. All comments will be available for public
inspection and copying.
A public hearing has been scheduled for November 14,
2007, beginning at 10 a.m. in the IRS Auditorium, Internal
Revenue Building, 1111 Constitution Avenue, NW.,
Washington, DC. Due to building security procedures,
visitors must enter at the Constitution Avenue entrance. In
addition, all visitors must present photo identification to enter
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the building. Because of access restrictions, visitors will not
be admitted beyond the immediate entrance area more than
15 minutes before the hearing starts. For information about
having your name placed on the building access list to attend
the hearing, see the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this preamble.
The rules of 26 CFR 601.601(a)(3) apply to the hearing.
Persons who wish to present oral comments at the hearing
must submit written or electronic comments and an outline of
the topics to be discussed and the time to be devoted to each
topic (signed original and eight (8) copies) by October 24,
2007. A period of 10 minutes will be allotted to each person
for making comments. An agenda showing the schedule of
speakers will be prepared after the deadline for receiving
outlines has passed. Copies of the agenda will be available
free of charge at the hearing.
Drafting Information
The principal author of these regulations is Jennifer N.
Keeney, Office of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel
(Passthroughs and Special Industries).
List of Subjects in 26 CFR Part 1
Income taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
Proposed Amendments to the Regulations
Accordingly, 26 CFR part 1 is proposed to be amended as
follows:
PART 1--INCOME TAXES
Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 1 continues
to read in part as follows:
Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *
Par. 2. Section 1.67-4 is added to read as follows:
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§ 1.67-4 Costs paid or incurred by estates or non-grantor
trusts.
(a) In general. Section 67(e) provides an exception to the
2-percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions for
costs that are paid or incurred in connection with the
administration of an estate or a trust not described in § 1.672T(g)(1)(i) (a non-grantor trust) and which would not have
been incurred if the property were not held in such estate or
trust. To the extent that a cost incurred by an estate or nongrantor trust is unique to such an entity, that cost is not
subject to the 2-percent floor on miscellaneous itemized
deductions. To the extent that a cost included in the
definition of miscellaneous itemized deductions and incurred
by an estate or non-grantor trust is not unique to such an
entity, that cost is subject to the 2-percent floor.
0~) Unique. For purposes of this section, a cost is unique
to an estate or a non-grantor trust if an individual could not
have incurred that cost in connection with property not held
in an estate or trust. In making this determination, it is the
type of product or service rendered to the estate or trust,
rather than the characterization of the cost of that product or
service, that is relevant. A non-exclusive list of products or
services that are unique to an estate or trust includes those
rendered in connection with: Fiduciary accountings; judicial
or quasi-judicial filings required as part of the administration
of the estate or trust; fiduciary income tax and estate tax
retums; the division or distribution of income or corpus to or
among beneficiaries; trust or will contest or construction;
fiduciary bond premiums; and communications with
beneficiaries regarding estate or trust matters. A nonexclusive list of products or services that are not unique to an
estate or trust, and therefore are subject to the 2-percent floor,
includes those rendered in connection with: Custody or
management of property; advice on investing for total retum;
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gift tax returns; the defense of claims by creditors of the
decedent or grantor; and the purchase, sale, maintenance,
repair, insurance or management of non-trade or business
property.
(c) "’Bundled fees. "’ If an estate or a non-grantor trust
pays a single fee, commission or other expense for both costs
that are unique to estates and trusts and costs that are not,
then the estate or non-grantor trust must identify the portion
(if any) of the legal, accounting, investment advisory,
appraisal or other fee, commission or expense that is unique
to estates and trusts and is thus not subject to the 2-percent
floor. The taxpayer must use any reasonable method to
allocate the single fee, commission or expense between the
costs unique to estates and trusts and other costs.
(d) Effective~applicability date. These regulations are
proposed to be effective for payments made after the date
final regulations are published in the Federal Register.
Kevin M. Brown,
Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement.
[FR Doc. E7-14489 Filed 7-26-07; 8:45 am]
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